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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Privatization and Efficiency: From Principals and Agents to Political Economy | |
Alberto Cavaliere; Simona Scabrosetti | |
发表日期 | 2006 |
出处 | Economy and Society |
出版年 | 2006 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We survey the theoretical literature on privatization and efficiency by tracing its evolution from the applications of agency theory to recent contributions in the field of political economy. The first ones extend the theory of regulation with incomplete information to address privatization issues, comparing State Owned Entreprises (SOEs) with private regulated firms. The benefits of privatization may either derive from the constraints it places on malevolent agents or to the impossibility of commitment by a benevolent government because of incomplete contracts. Contributions dealing with political economy issues separate privatization from restructuring decisions. They either explore bargaining between managers and politicians or analyze the impact of privatization shaped by political preferences on efficiency. The theoretical results regarding the relation between privatization and efficiency do not lead to any definitive conclusion. Privatization may increase productive efficiency when restructuring takes place whereas its effects on allocative efficiency still remain uncertain. |
特色分类 | L33,D82,P26 |
关键词 | Regulation,Imperfect Information,Political Preferences |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/privatization-and-efficiency-from-principals-and-agents-to-political-economy/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117362 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Cavaliere,Simona Scabrosetti. Privatization and Efficiency: From Principals and Agents to Political Economy. 2006. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
NDL2006-099.pdf(1367KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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