| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Endogenous Price Mechanisms, Capture and Accountability Rules: Theory and Evidence |
| Carmine Guerriero
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| 发表日期 | 2006
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 2006
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the constitutional determinants of cost reimbursement rules. In order to design the optimal incentive schemes, a possibly partisan planner will take into account the market cost structure, the institutional design of the supervision hierarchical structure and its technology. I employ electricity data from the U.S. electric power market to test the model's predictions. The evidence shows that reforms from low powered incentive scheme (COS) to high powered one (PBR) are linked to high cost industries, the presence of elected supervisors, high inter-party platform distance and large (slim) majority when the reformer is Republican (Democratic). Moreover, there is some evidence in the data that performance-based regulation lowers regulated prices. |
| 特色分类 | L51,D72,D82,H11
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| 关键词 | Industrial Policy,Political Economy,Regulation and Incentives
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/endogenous-price-mechanisms-capture-and-accountability-rules-theory-and-evidence/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117369
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Carmine Guerriero. Endogenous Price Mechanisms, Capture and Accountability Rules: Theory and Evidence. 2006.
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文件名：
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NDL2006-106.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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