| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and Evidence |
| Carmine Guerriero
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| 发表日期 | 2006
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 2006
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the effects of supervisors' (i.e., regulators and judges) selection rules on regulated prices. A checks and balances' regulatory review process strengthens the role of the judicial power and election increases the populism of implicitly motivated supervisors. Election arises when the risk related to expropriation of sunk investments and the inter-party distance are lower. Employing U.S. electric power market's data, the empirical evidence strongly confirms these predictions. Indeed, when treated as endogenous, only the election of administrative law judges and not the one of regulators significantly lowers the level of electricity rates. Moreover a more effective supervision technology shows a marginal negative effect on regulated rates as well. |
| 特色分类 | K23,L51,Q43
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| 关键词 | Election,Agency,Judges,Regulation,Electricity
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/dependent-controllers-and-regulation-policies-theory-and-evidence/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117372
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Carmine Guerriero. Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and Evidence. 2006.
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文件名：
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NDL2006-109.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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