全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements
	Erik Ansink; Arjan Ruijs
发表日期	2007
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2007
语种	英语
摘要	We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean river flow and an increase in the variance of river flow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.
特色分类	C7,Q25
关键词	Water Allocation,Stability,Climate Change,Game Theory
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/climate-change-and-the-stability-of-water-allocation-agreements/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117436
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Erik Ansink,Arjan Ruijs. Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements. 2007.