全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?
	Pierre von Mouche; Henk Folmer
发表日期	2007
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2007
语种	英语
摘要	Linking of repeated games and exchange of concessions in fields of relative strength may lead to more cooperation and to Pareto improvements relative to the situation where each game is played separately. In this paper we formalize these statements, provide some general results concerning the conditions for more cooperation and Pareto improvements to materialize or not and analyze the relation between both. Special attention is paid to the role of asymmetries.
特色分类	C72
关键词	Environmental Policy,Linking,Folk Theorem,Tensor Game,Prsioners' Dilemma,Full Cooperation,Pareto Efficiency,Minkowski Sum,Vector Maximum,Convex Analysis
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/linking-of-repeated-games-when-does-it-lead-to-more-cooperation-and-pareto-improvements/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117478
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Pierre von Mouche,Henk Folmer. Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?. 2007.