全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions
	Miyuki Nagashima; Rob Dellink
发表日期	2007
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2007
语种	英语
摘要	Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong free-riding incentives. This paper explores how different technology spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentive structures to join and stabilise an international agreement. We use an applied modelling framework (STACO) that enables us to investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several theories on the impact of technology spillovers are evaluated by simulating a range of alternative specifications. We find that while spillovers are a good instrument to improve stability of bilateral agreements, they cannot overcome the strong free rider incentives that are present in larger coalitions. This conclusion is robust against the specification of technology spillovers.
特色分类	C72,O33,Q54
关键词	Climate Change Modelling,International Environmental Agreements,Non-cooperative Game Theory,Technology Spillovers
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/technology-spillovers-and-stability-of-international-climate-coalitions/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117516
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Miyuki Nagashima,Rob Dellink. Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions. 2007.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
NDL2007-098.pdf（481KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览