| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| The Computational Difficulty of Bribery in Qualitative Coalitional Games | |
| Andrew Dowell; Michael Wooldridge; Peter McBurney | |
| 发表日期 | 2007 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Qualitative coalitional games (QCG) are representations of coalitional games in which self interested agents, each with their own individual goals, group together in order to achieve a set of goals which satisfy all the agents within that group. In such a representation, it is the strategy of the agents to find the best coalition to join. Previous work into QCGs has investigated the computational complexity of determining which is the best coalition to join. We plan to expand on this work by investigating the computational complexity of computing agent power in QCGs as well as by showing that insincere strategies, particularly bribery, are possible when the envy-freeness assumption is removed but that it is computationally difficult to identify the best agents to bribe. |
| 特色分类 | C63,C78 |
| 关键词 | Bribery,Coalition Formation,Computational Complexity |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-computational-difficulty-of-bribery-in-qualitative-coalitional-games/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117518 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Dowell,Michael Wooldridge,Peter McBurney. The Computational Difficulty of Bribery in Qualitative Coalitional Games. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2007-100.pdf（260KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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