| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| On Policy Interactions Among Nations: When Do Cooperation and Commitment Matter? | |
| Leopold von Thadden; Hubert Kempf | |
| 发表日期 | 2008 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper offers a framework to study commitment and cooperation issues in games with multiple policymakers. To reconcile some puzzles in the recent literature on the nature of policy interactions among nations, we prove that games characterized by different commitment and cooperation schemes can admit the same equilibrium outcome if certain spillover effects vanish at the common solution of these games. We provide a detailed discussion of these spillovers, showing that, in general, commitment and cooperation are non-trivial issues. Yet, in linear-quadratic models with multiple policymakers commitment and cooperation schemes are shown to become irrelevant under certain assumptions. The framework is sufficiently general to cover a broad range of results from the recent literature on policy interactions as special cases, both within monetary unions and among fully sovereign nations. |
| 特色分类 | E52,E63 |
| 关键词 | Monetary Policy,Fiscal Regimes |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/on-policy-interactions-among-nations-when-do-cooperation-and-commitment-matter/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117546 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Leopold von Thadden,Hubert Kempf. On Policy Interactions Among Nations: When Do Cooperation and Commitment Matter?. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2008-021.pdf（472KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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