| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Repeated Games Played in a Network |
| Markus Kinateder
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| 发表日期 | 2008
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2008
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. Due to this and the bilateral communication structure, truthful communication arises endogenously only under additional conditions. The model also produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network’s diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models. |
| 特色分类 | C72,C73,D85
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| 关键词 | Repeated Game,Delayed Perfect Monitoring,Network,Communication
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/repeated-games-played-in-a-network/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117547
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Markus Kinateder. Repeated Games Played in a Network. 2008.
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文件名：
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NDL2008-022.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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