| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation |
| Hideo Konishi; Taiji Furusawa
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| 发表日期 | 2008
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2008
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage, players simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to influence the government's choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987 JET), we show that the set of equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to an "intuitive" hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global efficiency. It is not necessarily true that an equilibrium lobby group is formed by the players with highest willingness-to-pay, nor is it a consecutive group with respect to their willingnesses-to-pay. We also show that the equilibrium level of public goods provision shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated. |
| 特色分类 | C71,C72,F13,H41
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| 关键词 | Common Agency,Public Good,Free Rider,Core,Lobby,Coalition Formation,Coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/contributing-or-free-riding-a-theory-of-endogenous-lobby-formation/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117548
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Hideo Konishi,Taiji Furusawa. Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation. 2008.
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文件名：
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NDL2008-023.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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