| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate Agreements with Renegotiations | |
| Hans-Peter Weikard; Rob Dellink | |
| 发表日期 | 2008 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines stability of international climate agreements for carbon abatement under an optimal transfer rule and renegotiations. The optimal transfer rule suggested to stabilise international environmental agreements (Weikard 2005, Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus 2006) is no longer optimal when agreements are renegotiated. We determine the conditions for optimal self-enforcing sequences of agreements. If these conditions are met, then transfer payments can be arranged such that no country wants to change its membership status at any stage. In order to demonstrate the applicability of our condition we use the STACO model, a 12-regions global model, to assess the impact of welldesigned transfer rules on the stability of an international climate agreement. Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition in the first commitment period in a game with one round of renegotiations. |
| 特色分类 | C72,D62,H41,H77 |
| 关键词 | Stability of Coalitions,International Environmental Agreements,Partition Function Approach,Sharing Rules,Optimal Transfers,Renegotiations |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/sticks-and-carrots-for-the-design-of-international-climate-agreements-with-renegotiations/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117551 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans-Peter Weikard,Rob Dellink. Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate Agreements with Renegotiations. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2008-026.pdf（237KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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