G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Network of Commons
Rahmi Ilkiliç
发表日期2008
出处Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年2008
语种英语
摘要A tragedy of the commons appears when the users of a common resource have incentives to exploit it more than the socially efficient level. We analyze the situation when the tragedy of the commons is embedded in a network of users and sources. Users play a game of extractions, where they decide how much resource to draw from each source they are connected to. We show that if the value of the resource to the users is linear, then each resource exhibits an isolated problem. There exists a unique equilibrium. But when the users have concave values, the network structure matters. The exploitation at each source depends on the centrality of the links connecting the source to the users. The equilibrium is unique and we provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure. Next we characterize the efficient levels of extractions by users and outflows from sources. Again, the case of linear values can be broken down source by source. For the case of concave values, we provide a graph decomposition which divides the network into regions according to the availability of sources. Then the efficiency problem can be solved region by region.
特色分类C62,C72,D85,Q20
关键词Tragedy of The Commons,Networks,Nash Equilibrium,Efficiency,Centrality Measures
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/network-of-commons/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117555
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Rahmi Ilkiliç. Network of Commons. 2008.
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