| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence from US States | |
| Carmine Guerriero | |
| 发表日期 | 2008 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The determinants of incentive regulation are a key issue in industrial policy. I study an asymmetric information model of incentive rules selection by a political principal endowed with an information-gathering technology whose efficiency increases with the effort exerted by two accountable supervisors (a regulator and a judge). This set up captures the institutions of several international markets. The model predicts that reforms toward higher powered rules are more likely the more inefficient (efficient) is the production (information-gathering) technology, the less tight is political competition and the greater are pro-consumer supervisors' incentives. This prediction is consistent with evidence based on US electric power market data. |
| 特色分类 | D73,H11,L51,K2 |
| 关键词 | Incentive schemes,Accountability Rules,Regulatory Capture |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-political-economy-of-incentive-regulation-theory-and-evidence-from-us-states/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117559 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Carmine Guerriero. The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence from US States. 2008. |
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| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2008-034.pdf（386KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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