| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Coalitional Matchings | |
| Dinko Dimitrov; Emiliya Lazarova | |
| 发表日期 | 2008 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in and over the student groups he would like to teach to. Correspondingly, each student has preferences over the groups of students he wants to study with and over the teams of researchers he would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides, the restriction of agents' preferences over groups to strict orderings, and the extent to which individual preferences respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. |
| 特色分类 | C78,J41,D71 |
| 关键词 | Coalitions,Common Rankings,Core,Stability,Totally Balanced Games,Two-Sided Matchings |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/coalitional-matchings/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117570 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dinko Dimitrov,Emiliya Lazarova. Coalitional Matchings. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2008-045.pdf（293KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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