| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Networks with Group Counterproposals |
| Ricardo Nieva
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| 发表日期 | 2008
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2008
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency. |
| 特色分类 | C71,C72,C73,C78
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| 关键词 | Efficiency,Bargaining Protocol,Counterproposals,Network Formation,Transfers,Externalities,Groups,Coalitions
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/networks-with-group-counterproposals/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117586
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Ricardo Nieva. Networks with Group Counterproposals. 2008.
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文件名：
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NDL2008-061.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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