| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy | |
| Michael Finus; Dirk T.G. Rübbelke | |
| 发表日期 | 2008 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also noncooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there are qualitative and strategic implications associated with ancillary benefits: climate policy is no longer a pure but an impure public good. In this paper, we investigate these implications in a setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. In particular, we address the following questions. 1) Do ancillary benefits increase participation in international environmental agreements? 2) Do ancillary benefits raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms? |
| 特色分类 | C72,H87,Q54 |
| 关键词 | Ancillary Benefits,Climate Policy,Coalition Formation,Game Theory,Impure Public Goods |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/coalition-formation-and-the-ancillary-benefits-of-climate-policy/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117587 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Finus,Dirk T.G. Rübbelke. Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2008-062.pdf（201KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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