| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services | |
| Gian Luigi Albano; Federico Dini; Roberto Zampino | |
| 发表日期 | 2008 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Competitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that open competition can perform poorly in allocating complex projects. In exploring the determinants of suppliers’ bidding behavior in procurement auctions for complex IT services, we find results that are consistent with theory. We find that price and quality do not exhibit the classical tradeoff one would expect: quite surprisingly, high quality is associated to low prices. Furthermore, while quality is mainly driven by suppliers’ experience, price is affected more by the scoring rule and by the level of expected competition. These results might suggest that (scoring) auctions fail to appropriately incorporate buyers’ complex price/quality preferences in the tender design. |
| 特色分类 | D44,D86,H51,H57 |
| 关键词 | Procurement Auctions,Scoring Rules,IT Contracts,Price/Quality Ratio |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/bidding-for-complex-projects-evidence-from-the-acquisitions-of-it-services/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117610 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gian Luigi Albano,Federico Dini,Roberto Zampino. Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2008-086.pdf（327KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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