全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core
	László Á. Kóczy
发表日期	2009
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2009
语种	英语
摘要	We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to extend past results to games that are not totally balanced (understood in this special setting) we introduce subgame-consistency that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while subgames that are never reached are ignored.
特色分类	C71;C72
关键词	Partition Function Externalities Implementation Recursive Core Stationary Perfect Equilibrium Time Consistent Equilibrium
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/stationary-consistent-equilibrium-coalition-structures-constitute-the-recursive-core/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117633
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	László Á. Kóczy. Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core. 2009.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
200911191049531Nota_（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
20091119104747483-09（339KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览