全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods
	Felix Bierbrauer
发表日期	2009
出处	Economy and Society
出版年	2009
语种	英语
摘要	The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a profit-maximizing firm. This also makes participation constraints desirable.
特色分类	D02;D82;H41;L51
关键词	Public goods Mechanism Design Incomplete Contracts Regulation
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/on-the-legitimacy-of-coercion-for-the-financing-of-public-goods/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117647
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Felix Bierbrauer. On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods. 2009.