全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination
	Ángel L. López; Patrick Rey
发表日期	2009
出处	Economy and Society
出版年	2009
语种	英语
摘要	This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tariffs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. Departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a profitable way. If the incumbent benefits from customer inertia, then it has an incentive to insist in the highest possible access markup even if access charges are reciprocal and even in the absence of actual switching costs. If instead the entrant benefits from customer activism, then foreclosure is profitable only when switching costs are large enough.
特色分类	L41;L51;L96
关键词	Access Pricing Entry Deterrence Interconnection Network Competition Two-way Access
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/foreclosing-competition-through-access-charges-and-price-discrimination/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117648
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Ángel L. López,Patrick Rey. Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination. 2009.