| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Non-Uniqueness of Equilibria in One-Shot Games of Strategic Communication | |
| Irene Valsecchi | |
| 发表日期 | 2009 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First, different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality, despite fixed prior beliefs. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size. Second, provided a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists, different message rules and beliefs can hold in other equilibria inducing the same action profile. |
| 特色分类 | D83 |
| 关键词 | Sender-Receiver Games,Strategic Information Transmission |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/non-uniqueness-of-equilibria-in-one-shot-games-of-strategic-communication/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117697 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Irene Valsecchi. Non-Uniqueness of Equilibria in One-Shot Games of Strategic Communication. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2009-019.pdf（259KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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