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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Connections Among Farsighted Agents | |
Vincent Vannetelbosch; Gilles Grandjean; Ana Mauleon | |
发表日期 | 2009 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 2009 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch's (Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming) notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set. We first investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks and the set of strongly efficient networks. We then provide some primitive conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly efficient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the set of strongly efficient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex. |
特色分类 | A14,C70,D20 |
关键词 | Farsighted Players,Stability,Efficiency,Connections Model,Buyerseller Networks |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/connections-among-farsighted-agents/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117708 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vincent Vannetelbosch,Gilles Grandjean,Ana Mauleon. Connections Among Farsighted Agents. 2009. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
NDL2009-030.pdf(347KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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