| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Matching Markets with Signals | |
| Alexey Kushnir | |
| 发表日期 | 2009 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A costless signaling mechanism has been proposed as a device to improve welfare in decentralized two-sided matching markets. An example of such an environment is a job market for new Ph.D. economists. We study a market game of incomplete information between firms and workers and show that costless signaling is actually harmful in some matching markets. Specifically, if agents have very similar preferences, signaling lessens the total number of matches and the welfare of firms, as well as it affects ambiguously the welfare of workers. These results run contrary to previous findings that costless signaling facilitates match formation. |
| 特色分类 | C70 |
| 关键词 | Matching Markets,Signaling |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/matching-markets-with-signals/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117717 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexey Kushnir. Matching Markets with Signals. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2009-039.pdf（340KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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