| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation |
| Marc Kilgour; Steven J. Brams
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| 发表日期 | 2009
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2009
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they "fall back" on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The players(s) who are the first to be acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition. The effects of different preference assumptions—particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness—and of player weights on the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated. The fallback procedure may be used (i) empirically to identify kingmakers and leaders or (ii) normatively to select them. |
| 特色分类 | C71,C78,D72
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| 关键词 | Coalition,Fallback Process,Kingmaker Leader,Cardinally Single-peaked,Ordinally Single-peaked
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/kingmakers-and-leaders-in-coalition-formation/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117719
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Marc Kilgour,Steven J. Brams. Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation. 2009.
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