| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Contractually Stable Networks | |
| Vincent Vannetelbosch; Jean-François Caulier; Ana Mauleon | |
| 发表日期 | 2009 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. Moreover, requiring the consent of group members may help to reconcile stability and efficiency. |
| 特色分类 | A14,C70 |
| 关键词 | Networks,Coalition Structures,Contractual Stability,Allocation Rules |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/contractually-stable-networks/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117725 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vincent Vannetelbosch,Jean-François Caulier,Ana Mauleon. Contractually Stable Networks. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2009-047.pdf（353KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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