| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts |
| Jean Tirole; Emmanuel Farhi
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| 发表日期 | 2009
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 2009
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | The paper elicits a mechanism by which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy. When everyone engages in maturity transformation, authorities have little choice but facilitating refinancing. In turn, refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the return on equity. The key ingredient is that monetary policy is non-targeted. The ex post benefits from a monetary bailout accrue in proportion to the number amount of leverage, while the distortion costs are to a large extent fixed. This insight has important consequences. First, banks choose to correlate their risk exposures. Second, private borrowers may deliberately choose to increase their interest-rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for liquidity. Third, optimal monetary policy is time inconsistent. Fourth, macro-prudential supervision is called for. We characterize the optimal regulation, which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets. We establish the robustness of our insights when the set of bailout instruments is endogenous and characterize the structure of optimal bailouts.
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Suggested citation: Farhi, Emmanuel, and Jean Tirole, 2012, "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts." American Economic Review, 102(1): 60-93, DOI:10.1257/aer.102.1.60 |
| 特色分类 | E44,E52,G28
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| 关键词 | Monetary Policy,Funding Liquidity Risk,Strategic Complementarities,Macro-Prudential Supervision
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/collective-moral-hazard-maturity-mismatch-and-systemic-bailouts/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117734
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jean Tirole,Emmanuel Farhi. Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts. 2009.
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文件名：
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NDL2009-057.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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