| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model | |
| Valentina Bosetti; Carlo Carraro; Enrica De Cian; Romain Duval; Emanuele Massetti; Massimo Tavoni | |
| 发表日期 | 2009 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able to meet a concentration stabilisation target below 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller but still environmentally significant coalitions appear to be stable. This is because the collective welfare surplus from cooperation is not found to be large enough for transfers to offset the free-riding incentives of all countries simultaneously. Some factors omitted from the analysis, which might improve coalition stability, include the co-benefits from mitigation action, the costless removal of fossil fuel subsidies, as well as alternative assumptions regarding countries’ bargaining behaviour. |
| 特色分类 | C68,C72,D58,Q54 |
| 关键词 | Climate Policy,Climate Coalition,Game Theory,Free Riding |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-incentives-to-participate-in-and-the-stability-of-international-climate-coalitions-a-game-theoretic-analysis-using-the-witch-model/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117741 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Valentina Bosetti,Carlo Carraro,Enrica De Cian,et al. The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| 20091211125749464-09（1264KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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