G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Informal Finance: A Theory of Moneylenders
Andreas Madestam
发表日期2009
出处Economy and Society
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要I study the coexistence of formal and informal finance in underdeveloped credit markets. While weak institutions constrain formal banks, shallow pockets hamper informal lenders. In such economies, informal finance has two effects. By increasing the investment return it decreases borrowers’ relative payoff following default, inducing banks to lend more liberally (disciplinary effect). By channeling bank capital it reduces banks’ agency costs from lending directly to borrowers, limiting banks’ extension of borrower credit (rent-extraction effect). Among other things, the model shows that informal interest rates are higher, borrower welfare lower, and informal finance more prevalent when the rent-extraction effect prevails, consistent with stylized facts in poor societies.
特色分类O12,O16,O17,D40
关键词Credit Markets,Financial Development,Institutions,Market Structure
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/informal-finance-a-theory-of-moneylenders/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117746
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Andreas Madestam. Informal Finance: A Theory of Moneylenders. 2009.
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