| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation |
| Erik Ansink
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| 发表日期 | 2009
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2009
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Many water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inherently unstable. Due to stochastic river flow, agreements may be broken in case of drought. The objective of this paper is to analyse whether water allocation agreements can be self-enforcing. An agreement is modelled as the outcome of bargaining game on river water allocation. Given this agreement, the bargaining game is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in which countries decide whether or not to comply with the agreement. I assess under what conditions such agreements are self-enforcing, given stochastic river flow. The results show that, for sufficiently low discounting, every efficient agreement can be sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium. Requiring renegotiation-proofness may shrink the set of possible agreements to a unique self-enforcing agreement. The solution induced by this particular agreement implements the "downstream incremental distribution", an axiomatic solution to water allocation that assigns all gains from cooperation to downstream countries. |
| 特色分类 | C73,Q25
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| 关键词 | Self-Enforcing Agreement,Repeated Extensive-Form Game,Water Allocation,Renegotiation-Proofness
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/self-enforcing-agreements-on-water-allocation/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117749
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Erik Ansink. Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation. 2009.
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文件名：
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NDL2009-073.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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