G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation
Erik Ansink
发表日期2009
出处Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要Many water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inherently unstable. Due to stochastic river flow, agreements may be broken in case of drought. The objective of this paper is to analyse whether water allocation agreements can be self-enforcing. An agreement is modelled as the outcome of bargaining game on river water allocation. Given this agreement, the bargaining game is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in which countries decide whether or not to comply with the agreement. I assess under what conditions such agreements are self-enforcing, given stochastic river flow. The results show that, for sufficiently low discounting, every efficient agreement can be sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium. Requiring renegotiation-proofness may shrink the set of possible agreements to a unique self-enforcing agreement. The solution induced by this particular agreement implements the "downstream incremental distribution", an axiomatic solution to water allocation that assigns all gains from cooperation to downstream countries.
特色分类C73,Q25
关键词Self-Enforcing Agreement,Repeated Extensive-Form Game,Water Allocation,Renegotiation-Proofness
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/self-enforcing-agreements-on-water-allocation/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117749
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Erik Ansink. Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation. 2009.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
NDL2009-073.pdf(306KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Erik Ansink]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Erik Ansink]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Erik Ansink]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: NDL2009-073.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。