| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors | |
| Yolande Hiriart; David Martimort; Jerome Pouyet | |
| 发表日期 | 2010 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to implement safety care requires public intervention which can take the form of both monetary incentives but also ex ante or ex post monitoring, i.e., before or after an accident occurs. We delineate the optimal scope of monitoring depending on whether public monitors are benevolent or corruptible. We show that separating the ex ante and the ex post monitors increases the likelihood of ex post investigation, helps prevent capture and improves welfare. |
| 特色分类 | L51;D82 |
| 关键词 | Risk Regulation Monitoring Capture Integration Separation |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-public-management-of-risk-separating-ex-ante-and-ex-post-monitors/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117767 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yolande Hiriart,David Martimort,Jerome Pouyet. The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| 2010115164221Nota_di（71KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 20101151642194NDL201（395KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 文件名： | 2010115164221Nota_di_Lavoro.jpg |
| 格式： | JPEG |
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