全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Repeated Cheap-Talk Games of Common Interest between a Decision-Maker and an Expert of Unknown Statistical Bias

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Repeated Cheap-Talk Games of Common Interest between a Decision-Maker and an Expert of Unknown Statistical Bias
	Irene Valsecchi
发表日期	2010
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2010
语种	英语
摘要	Two agents are engaged in a joint activity that yields a common perperiod payoff at two rounds of play. The expert announces the probability that the current state of the world is low, instead of high, at each stage. Having received the report of the expert, the decision-maker takes action at every period according to his posterior beliefs. At the end of each round of play, the true current state is verifiable. The distinctive assumption of the paper is that the decision-maker makes a subjective appraisal of the expert’s reliability: he considers the expert’s true forecasts as the outcomes of an experiment of unknown statistical bias. The paper shows that the expert will have instrumental reputational concerns, related to the future estimate of the systematic error associated to his predictions. In contrast with previous work, reputational concerns are shown to enhance the credibility of the initial messages, and to increase both the agents’ expected payoff at the first round of play in equilibrium. The equilibrium messages will be noisy, but noisiness will be less costly than it would be in single-stage games.
特色分类	D81;D84
关键词	Opinion Expert Strategic Communication
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/repeated-cheap-talk-games-of-common-interest-between-a-decision-maker-and-an-expert-of-unknown-statistical-bias/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117770
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Irene Valsecchi. Repeated Cheap-Talk Games of Common Interest between a Decision-Maker and an Expert of Unknown Statistical Bias. 2010.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
2010115924471Nota_di（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
201011592564NDL2010-（436KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览