全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network
	Lionel Richefort; Patrick Point
发表日期	2010
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2010
语种	英语
摘要	A local public-good game played on directed networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by one-way flows of hydrological influence between cities of a river basin that may shape the level of their contribution to the conservation of wetlands. It is shown that in many (but not all) directed networks, there exists an equilibrium, sometimes socially desirable, in which some stakeholders exert maximal effort and the others free ride. It is also shown that more directed links are not always better. Finally, the model is applied to the conservation of wetlands in the Gironde estuary (France).
特色分类	C72;D85;H41
关键词	Common-pool Resource Digraph Cycle Independent Set Empirical Example
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/governing-a-common-pool-resource-in-a-directed-network/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117771
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Lionel Richefort,Patrick Point. Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network. 2010.