| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Tradable Permits vs Ecological Dumping | |
| Fabio Antoniou; Panos Hatzipanayotou; Phoebe Koundouri | |
| 发表日期 | 2010 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting firms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an incentive to under-regulate pollution in order to become more competitive. This strategic effect is reversed and leads to a welfare level closer to the cooperative one and strictly higher to that when permits are non-tradable. Allowing for market power in the permits market, the incentive to under-regulate pollution re-appears regardless of whether permits are tradable or not. With tradable permits, however, the incentive to under-regulate pollution is comparatively weaker relative to the case of non-tradable permits. This entails potential benefits for the exporting firms and countries since the prisoners’ dilemma is moderated. |
| 关键词 | Strategic Environmental Policy Tradable Permits Race to the top |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/tradable-permits-vs-ecological-dumping/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117781 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fabio Antoniou,Panos Hatzipanayotou,Phoebe Koundouri. Tradable Permits vs Ecological Dumping. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| 20101271915371Nota_d（71KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 20101271915154NDL201（304KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 文件名： | 20101271915371Nota_di_Lavoro.jpg |
| 格式： | JPEG |
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