全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Public Security vs. Private Self-Protection: Optimal Taxation and the Social Dynamics of Fear

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Public Security vs. Private Self-Protection: Optimal Taxation and the Social Dynamics of Fear
	Angelo Antoci; Pier Luigi Sacco; Mauro Sodini
发表日期	2010
出处	Economy and Society
出版年	2010
语种	英语
摘要	In this paper, we develop a simple model of social dynamics governing the evolution of strategic self-protection choices of boundedly rational potential victims facing the threat of prospective offenders in a large population with random matching. We prove that individual (and socially transmitted) fear of exposure to criminal threats may actually condition choices even in the face of objective evidence of declining crime rates, and thereby cause the eventual selection of Pareto inefficient equilibria with self-protection. We also show that a suitable strategy of provision of public security financed through discriminatory taxation of self-protective expenses may actually overcome this problem, and drive the social dynamics toward the efficient no protection equilibrium. In our model, we do not obtain, as in Cressman et al. (1998), a crowding-out result such that the net impact of public spending on the actual social dynamics is neutral and the economy keeps on cycling between phases of high and low criminal activity with varying levels of self-protection; quite to the contrary, it can be extremely effective in implementing the social optimum, in that it acts primarily on the intangible dimension, that is, on the social dynamics of fear. We claim that this kind of result calls for more interdisciplinary research on the socio-psycho-economic determinants of fear of crime, and for consequent advances in modelling approaches and techniques.
特色分类	C73;H23;K49
关键词	Self-Protection Fear of Crime Cultural Selection Dynamics Replicator Dynamics
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/public-security-vs-private-self-protection-optimal-taxation-and-the-social-dynamics-of-fear/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117835
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Angelo Antoci,Pier Luigi Sacco,Mauro Sodini. Public Security vs. Private Self-Protection: Optimal Taxation and the Social Dynamics of Fear. 2010.

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2010491042301Nota_di（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
20104911174NDL2010-0（950KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览