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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Executive Compensation: Facts | |
Gian Luca Clementi; Thomas Cooley | |
发表日期 | 2010 |
出处 | Economy and Society |
出版年 | 2010 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Notable facts are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable fraction of chief executives lose money; the use of security grants has increased over time; the income accruing to CEOs from the sale of stock increased; regardless of the measure we adopt, compensation responds strongly to innovations in shareholder wealth; measured as dollar changes in compensation, incentives have strengthened over time, measured as percentage changes in wealth, they have not changed in any appreciable way. |
特色分类 | G34;J33;M52 |
关键词 | CEO Pay–Performance Sensitivity Stock Options |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/executive-compensation-facts/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117866 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gian Luca Clementi,Thomas Cooley. Executive Compensation: Facts. 2010. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
20106251558341Nota_d(71KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
20106251558504NDL201(1648KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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