| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| Innovation and Institutional Ownership |
| Philippe Aghion; John Van Reenen; Luigi Zingales
|
| 发表日期 | 2010
|
| 出处 | Economy and Society
|
| 出版年 | 2010
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We find that institutional ownership in publicly traded companies is associated with more innovation (measured by cite-weighted patents). To explore the mechanism through which this link arises, we build a model that nests the lazy-manager hypothesis with career-concerns, where institutional owners increase managerial incentives to innovate by reducing the career risk of risky projects. The data supports the career concerns model. First, whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts a substitution effect between institutional ownership and product market competition (and managerial entrenchment generally), the career-concern model allows for complementarity. Empirically, we reject substitution effects. Second, CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of profit downturns when institutional ownership is higher. Finally, using instrumental variables, policy changes and disaggregating by type of owner we find that the effect of institutions on innovation does not appear to be due to endogenous selection. |
| 特色分类 | G20;G32;O31;O32;O33
|
| 关键词 | Career Concerns
Innovation
Institutional Ownership
Productivity and R&D
|
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/innovation-and-institutional-ownership/
|
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117880
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Philippe Aghion,John Van Reenen,Luigi Zingales. Innovation and Institutional Ownership. 2010.
|
|
文件名：
|
20107301259281Nota_di_Lavoro.jpg
|
|
格式：
|
JPEG
|
|
文件名：
|
20107301259464NDL2010-099.pdf
|
|
格式：
|
Adobe PDF
|
此文件暂不支持浏览
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
