全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values
	Françoise Forges; Ram Orzach
发表日期	2010
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2010
语种	英语
摘要	In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism.
特色分类	C71;C72;D44
关键词	Auctions Bayesian game Collusion Core Partition form game Characteristic function
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/core-stable-rings-in-second-price-auctions-with-common-values/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117894
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Françoise Forges,Ram Orzach. Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values. 2010.