全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network
	Markus Kinateder
发表日期	2010
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2010
语种	英语
摘要	Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game’s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough. All equilibria under exogenously imposed truth-telling extend to strategic communication, and additional ones arise due to richer communication. There are equilibria in which a player lies. The flow of information is related with network centrality measures.
特色分类	C72;C73;D85
关键词	Repeated Game Prisoner’s Dilemma Imperfect Private Monitoring Network Strategic Communication Centrality
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-repeated-prisoner-s-dilemma-in-a-network/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117896
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Markus Kinateder. The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network. 2010.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
20109221751231Nota_d（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
20109221751374NDL201（297KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览