| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets |
| Alexey Kushnir
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| 发表日期 | 2010
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2010
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Some labor markets have recently developed formal signalling mechanisms, e.g. the signalling for interviews in the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Workers have almost aligned preferences over firms: each worker has “typical” commonly known preferences with probability close to one and “atypical” idiosyncratic preferences with the complementary probability close to zero. Firms have some commonly known preferences over workers. We show that the introduction of a signalling mechanism is harmful for this environment. Though signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. As a result, the introduction of a signalling mechanism lessens the expected number of matches when signals are informative. |
| 特色分类 | C72;C78;D80;J44
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| 关键词 | Signaling
Cheaptalk
Matching
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/harmful-signaling-in-matching-markets/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117897
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Alexey Kushnir. Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets. 2010.
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