全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers: A Non-cooperative Bargaining Analysis

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers: A Non-cooperative Bargaining Analysis
	Maria Montero
发表日期	2010
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2010
语种	英语
摘要	Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of majoritarian bargaining and shows that the paradox is predicted in equilibrium for past EU enlargements. Furthermore, a majority of members would have been in favor of the 1981 enlargement even if members were bargaining over a fixed budget.
特色分类	C71;C72;C78
关键词	Majoritarian Bargaining Weighted Voting Power Measures EU Enlargement Paradox of New Members
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-paradox-of-new-members-in-the-eu-council-of-ministers-a-non-cooperative-bargaining-analysis/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117899
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Maria Montero. The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers: A Non-cooperative Bargaining Analysis. 2010.