| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Group Bargaining and Conflict |
| Nicolas Quérou
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| 发表日期 | 2010
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2010
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We consider a situation where groups negotiate over the allocation of a surplus (which is used to fund group specific goods). Each group is composed of agents who have differing valuations for public goods. Members choose a representative to take decisions on their behalf. Specifically, representatives can decide to enter either a (cooperative) negotiation protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata allocation (as a function of the size of the groups). We analyse the conditions (on the internal composition of the groups) under which conflict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa), and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we provide results of comparative statics that highlight the influence of changes in the internal composition of groups and in their relative size on the profitability of negotiated agreements. |
| 特色分类 | C78;D74;J52
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| 关键词 | Bargaining
Conflict
Agency Problem
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/group-bargaining-and-conflict/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117901
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Nicolas Quérou. Group Bargaining and Conflict. 2010.
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20109271417204NDL2010-125.pdf
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