| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management | |
| Alessandro Tavoni; Maja Schlüter; Simon Levin | |
| 发表日期 | 2010 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource (CPR), we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment. |
| 特色分类 | C73;Q20;D70 |
| 关键词 | Cooperation Social Norm Ostracism Common Pool Resource Evolutionary Game Theory Replicator Equation Agent-based Simulation Coupled Socio-resource Dynamics |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-survival-of-the-conformist-social-pressure-and-renewable-resource-management/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117903 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Tavoni,Maja Schlüter,Simon Levin. The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| 20109301131291Nota_d（71KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 20109301131494NDL201（758KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 文件名： | 20109301131291Nota_di_Lavoro.jpg |
| 格式： | JPEG |
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