全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safe

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safe
	Gérard Mondello
发表日期	2010
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2010
语种	英语
摘要	This paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the environment in an economy regulated by strict liability schemes. Strict liability induces judgment-proof possibilities. Two civil liability regimes are then compared: a strict liability scheme and a capped strict liability one. The argument is led under a twofold asymmetric information assumption between the principal and the agent: the efficiency level in effort for safety and the agent’s level of wealth. The paper shows that standard strict liability under information asymmetries deters the efficient agent to compete and favors adverse selection. Then, under conditions, a capped strict liability regime is a better regime than a standard strict liability one because it induces the efficient agent to supply the level of safety effort equivalent to the first best solution. The counterpart is the perception of an informational rent by the efficient agent. At the optimum, this rent is minimized by the efficient contract supplied by the principal.
特色分类	K0;K32;Q01;Q58
关键词	Environment Strict Liability Ex-Ante Regulation Ex-Post Liability Judgment-Proof Environment Law CERCLA Environmental Liability
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/risky-activities-and-strict-liability-rules-delegating-safe/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117908
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Gérard Mondello. Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safe. 2010.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
201093161181Nota_di_（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
2010931616444NDL2010（275KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览