| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Alliance Formation and Coercion in Networks |
| Timo Hiller
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| 发表日期 | 2011
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2011
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payoffs from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with more allies obtains a larger share of the surplus. I show that Nash equilibria are of two types. First, a state of utopia, where all agents are allies. Second, asymmetric equilibria, such that agents can be partitioned into sets of different size, where agents within the same set are allies and agents in different sets are enemies. These results stand in contrast to coalition formation games in the economics of conflict literature, where stable group structures are generally symmetric. The model provides a game-theoretic foundation for structural balance, a long- standing notion in social psychology, which has been fruitfully applied to the study of alliance formation in international relations. |
| 特色分类 | D86;D74
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| 关键词 | Network Formation
Economics of Conflict
Contest Success Function
Structural Balance
International Relations
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/alliance-formation-and-coercion-in-networks/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117975
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Timo Hiller. Alliance Formation and Coercion in Networks. 2011.
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20116112014NDL2011-042.pdf
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