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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Strategic Network Interdiction | |
Sunghoon Hong | |
发表日期 | 2011 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 2011 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. The bads carried to the target cause a target loss while the blocked arcs cause a network loss. The adversary earns and the agency loses from both target loss and network loss. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. In this model we study Nash equilibria and find a power law relation between the probability and the extent of the target loss. Our model contributes to the literature of game theory by introducing non-cooperative behavior into a Kalai-Zemel (cooperative) game of flow. Our research also advances models and results on network interdiction. |
特色分类 | C72;D85;H56 |
关键词 | Network Interdiction Noncooperative Game of Flow Nash Equilibrium Power Law Kalai-Zemel Game of Flow |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/strategic-network-interdiction/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117976 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sunghoon Hong. Strategic Network Interdiction. 2011. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
2011611213271Nota_di(71KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
2011611213444NDL2011(388KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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