| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Dynamic Multilateral Markets |
| Arnold Polanski; Emiliya A. Lazarova
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| 发表日期 | 2011
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2011
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players’ payoffs result from coalitional bargaining. In this setting, we establish payoff uniqueness of the stationary equilibria when players exhibit some degree of impatience. We focus on market games with different player types, and derive under mild conditions an explicit formula for each type’s equilibrium payoff as market frictions vanish. The limit payoff of a type depends in an intuitive way on the supply and the demand for this type in the market, adjusted by the type-specific bargaining power. Our framework may be viewed as an alternative to the Walrasian price-setting mechanism. When we apply this methodology to the analysis of labor markets, we can determine endogenously the equilibrium firm size and remuneration scheme. We find that each worker type in a stationary market equilibrium is rewarded her marginal product, i.e. we obtain a strategic underpinning of the neoclassical wage. Interestingly, we can also replicate some standardized facts from the search-theoretical literature such as positive equilibrium unemployment. |
| 特色分类 | C71;C72;C78;J30;L20
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| 关键词 | Multilateral Bargaining
Dynamic Markets
Labor Markets
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/dynamic-multilateral-markets/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117977
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Arnold Polanski,Emiliya A. Lazarova. Dynamic Multilateral Markets. 2011.
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201161133391Nota_di_Lavoro.jpg
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20116113594NDL2011-044.pdf
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