| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Renewable Energy Subsidies: Second-Best Policy or Fatal Aberration for Mitigation? | |
| Matthias Kalkuhl; Ottmar Edenhofer; Kai Lessmann | |
| 发表日期 | 2011 |
| 出处 | Energy: Resources and Markets |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper evaluates the consequences of renewable energy policies on welfare, resource rents and energy costs in a world where carbon pricing is imperfect and the regulator seeks to limit emissions to a (cumulative) target. We use a global general equilibrium model with an intertemporal fossil resource sector. We calculate the optimal second-best renewable energy subsidy and compare the resulting welfare level with an efficient first-best carbon pricing policy. If carbon pricing is permanently missing, mitigation costs increase by a multiple (compared to the optimal carbon pricing policy) for a wide range of parameters describing extraction costs, renewable energy costs, substitution possibilities and normative attitudes. Furthermore, we show that small deviations from the second-best subsidy can lead to strong increases in emissions and consumption losses. This confirms the rising concerns about the occurrence of unintended side effects of climate policy { a new version of the green paradox. We extend our second-best analysis by considering two further types of policy instruments: (1) temporary subsidies that are displaced by carbon pricing in the long run and (2) revenue-neutral instruments like a carbon trust and a feed-in-tariff scheme. Although these instruments cause small welfare losses, they have the potential to ease distributional conflicts as they lead to lower energy prices and higher fossil resource rents than the optimal carbon pricing policy. |
| 特色分类 | Q4;Q52;Q54;Q58;D58;H21 |
| 关键词 | Feed-in-Tariff Carbon Trust Carbon Pricing Supply-Side Dynamics Green Paradox Climate Policy |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/renewable-energy-subsidies-second-best-policy-or-fatal-aberration-for-mitigation/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117980 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthias Kalkuhl,Ottmar Edenhofer,Kai Lessmann. Renewable Energy Subsidies: Second-Best Policy or Fatal Aberration for Mitigation?. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| 2011620942321Nota_di（71KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 2011620942454NDL2011（650KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 文件名： | 2011620942321Nota_di_Lavoro.jpg |
| 格式： | JPEG |
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