全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Punish and Perish?

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Punish and Perish?
	Angelo Antoci; Luca Zarri
发表日期	2011
出处	Economy and Society
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	The evolution of large-scale cooperation among genetic strangers is a fundamental unanswered question in the social sciences. Behavioral economics has persuasively shown that so called ‘strong reciprocity’ plays a key role in accounting for the endogenous enforcement of cooperation. Insofar as strongly reciprocal players are willing to costly sanction defectors, cooperation flourishes. However, experimental evidence unambiguously indicates that not only defection and strong reciprocity, but also unconditional cooperation is a quantitatively important behavioral attitude. By referring to a prisoner’s dilemma framework where punishment (‘stick’) and rewarding (‘carrot’) options are available, here we show analytically that the presence of cooperators who don’t punish in the population makes altruistic punishment evolutionarily weak. We show that cooperation breaks down and strong reciprocity is maladaptive if costly punishment means ‘punishing defectors’ and, even more so, if it is coupled with costly rewarding of cooperators. In contrast, punishers don’t perish if cooperators, far from being rewarded, are sanctioned. These results, based on an extended notion of strong reciprocity, challenge evolutionary explanations of cooperation that overlook the ‘dark side’ of altruistic behavior.
特色分类	C7;D7;Z1
关键词	Cooperation Strong Reciprocity Altruistic Punishment Altruistic Rewarding Heterogeneous Types
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/punish-and-perish/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117997
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Angelo Antoci,Luca Zarri. Punish and Perish?. 2011.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
2011911213521Nota_di（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
201191121444NDL2011-（340KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览