| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| River Sharing and Water Trade | |
| Erik Ansink; Michael Gengenbach; Hans-Peter Weikard | |
| 发表日期 | 2012 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory. |
| 特色分类 | C72;D74;H23;Q25 |
| 关键词 | River Sharing Water Trade Market Emergence Property Rights Coalition Stability |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/river-sharing-and-water-trade/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118052 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Erik Ansink,Michael Gengenbach,Hans-Peter Weikard. River Sharing and Water Trade. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| 2012322164461Nota_di（71KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 2012322165164NDL2012（375KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 文件名： | 2012322164461Nota_di_Lavoro.jpg |
| 格式： | JPEG |
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