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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Intermediation in Networks | |
Jan-Peter Siedlarek | |
发表日期 | 2012 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 2012 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper studies bargaining and exchange in a networked market with intermediation. Possibilities to trade are restricted through a network of existing relationships and traders bargain over the division of available gains from trade along different feasible routes. Using a stochastic model of bargaining, I characterize stationary equilibrium payoffs as the fixed point of a set of intuitive value function equations and study efficiency and the relationship between network structure and payoffs. In equilibrium, trade is never unduly delayed but it may take place too early and in states where delay would be efficient. The inefficiency arises from a hold-up threat and the inability of bargaining parties credibly to commit to a split in a future period. The model also shows how with competing trade routes as trade frictions go to zero agents that are not essential to a trade opportunity receive a payoff of zero. |
特色分类 | C73;C78;L14 |
关键词 | Stochastic Games Bargaining Random Matching Middlemen Network |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/intermediation-in-networks/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118074 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jan-Peter Siedlarek. Intermediation in Networks. 2012. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
20125291410211Nota_d(71KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
20125291410364NDL201(498KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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